21![An Auction Mechanism for a Cloud Spot Market Adel Nadjaran Toosi, Kurt Van Mechelen, and Rajkumar Buyya December 2, 2014 Abstract An Auction Mechanism for a Cloud Spot Market Adel Nadjaran Toosi, Kurt Van Mechelen, and Rajkumar Buyya December 2, 2014 Abstract](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/496aa7f60b049281e487375af01dc5fb.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.cloudbus.orgLanguage: English - Date: 2014-12-04 04:34:06
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22![AUCTION TERMS & CONDITIONS 1. All bidders must register and obtain a numbered card. Successful bidders will show their card to the Auctioneer. Without registration, bids will not be accepted. (No number, no bid[removed]% AUCTION TERMS & CONDITIONS 1. All bidders must register and obtain a numbered card. Successful bidders will show their card to the Auctioneer. Without registration, bids will not be accepted. (No number, no bid[removed]%](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/4b56448795db8e66f70716b681c1d16d.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: mfl.com.fjLanguage: English - Date: 2012-08-21 03:20:07
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23![An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects By LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL* When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascendin An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects By LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL* When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascendin](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/c92ab326bf399919b3359ef332c6602b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:38
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24![THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT Reportable Case No: [removed]In the matter between: THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT Reportable Case No: [removed]In the matter between:](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/49dc5fe3b05b1e58803d8f3da917b075.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.justice.gov.zaLanguage: English - Date: 2015-03-31 07:20:46
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25![AN EFFICIENT ASCENDING-BID AUCTION FOR DISSIMILAR OBJECTS by AN EFFICIENT ASCENDING-BID AUCTION FOR DISSIMILAR OBJECTS by](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/0f5462669c91b47b747366ee75a2e188.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:37
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26![[removed]B/W Ausubel[removed]:44 PM Page 313 Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL [removed]B/W Ausubel[removed]:44 PM Page 313 Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/1838e900da72de7a0762536d6f29be44.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:38
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27![AN EFFICIENT ASCENDING-BID AUCTION FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTS by AN EFFICIENT ASCENDING-BID AUCTION FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTS by](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/0ee0f743033c03980909611c381d3b44.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:37
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28![Microsoft Word - ausubel-cramton-troubled-asset-reverse-auction.doc Microsoft Word - ausubel-cramton-troubled-asset-reverse-auction.doc](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/eb1fc2d72125a5de25527765bdfd0c92.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:39
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29![Auctioning Securities Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton* University of Maryland March[removed]first draft February 1997) Auctioning Securities Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton* University of Maryland March[removed]first draft February 1997)](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/4d75bfb8db37dfdc387b024b6fc5ad4c.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:37
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30![ON GENERALIZING THE ENGLISH AUCTION by Lawrence M. Ausubel* ON GENERALIZING THE ENGLISH AUCTION by Lawrence M. Ausubel*](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ee7289662e7beb7c454d02b513d1875f.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.ausubel.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:37
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